

Resource mobilization and the Convention on Biological Diversity: Moving beyond the gap

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Three patterns characterize resource mobilization since the advent of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 1992:

- 1) **Insufficient resources flowing to all three CBD objectives**,¹ due to developed-country governments failing to deliver on obligations to provide new and additional financial resources to enable developing countries to effectively implement their commitments.² This is often referred to as the “financing gap”: the discrepancy between what is needed to finance the three objectives and the resources available.
- 2) **Widespread austerity in the public sphere and ongoing resource and wealth transfers from developing to developed countries via extractivism, debt servicing, tax evasion and trade measures**.³ This has pushed states,

multilateral development banks (MDBs), and some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to create and promote a flurry of largely inadequate and at times deleterious initiatives to entice private capital into achieving CBD objectives.

- 3) **Exponential growth in public and private financial flows fuelling biodiversity-degrading industries and sectors amidst ineffective voluntary approaches** to “regulate” these financial flows and businesses.

“The gap” – pattern one – has dominated biodiversity policy discussions, obfuscating patterns two and three: the glut of free-floating, unregulated public and private finance bankrolling extinction coupled with persistent austerity and ongoing resource transfers from developing to developed countries.

There is an alternative approach: one that centres strong state and multilateral action to regulate and redirect flows of biodiversity- and community-degrading finance, one that advances public institutions and policies capable of rectifying past and present global inequalities. The importance of coordinated *global* action linking environmental and social justice has become even more apparent amid calls for a green recovery from pandemic-induced economic recession. As economist Jayati

¹ These objectives are: 1) conservation of biological diversity, 2) sustainable use of its components, and 3) the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources.

² This briefing uses the terminology of “developed countries” and “developing countries” as these are the terms used in the CBD and have legal implications for rights and obligations.

³ Extractivism has a variety of definitions, but typically it refers to economic activities that involve natural resources, including minerals and fossil fuels, but also large-scale monocultural agriculture, forestry and fisheries. Under extractivism, the benefits from these economic processes disproportionately benefit nations, multinationals, financial firms, and consumers in the Global North.

Ghosh recently put it, “Internationalism is not a luxury. It is a necessity.”⁴

There is some recognition of this alternative in the proposed resource mobilization component of the post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) that is currently being negotiated. It outlines three pillars of its mission to accomplish “transformative, inclusive and equitable change across economies and society”:⁵ a) *reducing or redirecting resources causing harm to biodiversity*; b) *generating additional resources from all sources to achieve the three objectives of the Convention*; and c) *enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of resource use*.⁶

This is a welcome shift. But efforts to advance transformative change and these three goals must learn from the past and from the established research. In a longer research report titled “Beyond the gap: placing biodiversity finance in the global economy”, we explore the track record of existing efforts and initiatives for achieving each of these objectives. Key insights from that dossier are summarized below. As we detail in the recommendations section, deep political-economic reforms and dedicated public investment are required to ensure ambitious progress towards CBD goals, including the conservation, sustainable use and fair and equitable benefit sharing of global biodiversity use for current and future generations.

Learning from previous rounds of climate and biodiversity finance is especially important in light of growing enthusiasm for “nature-based solutions” (NBS). Advocates of the NBS approach should heed one lesson in particular: piling investment into nature without addressing the primary ingredients of extractivism – namely, international trade and financial rules, deep wealth inequalities, high debt loads, and pervasive

austerity – is a recipe for planetary ruin and further human rights abuses.

Key lessons to inform resource mobilization and the post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework

a) *Reducing or redirecting resources causing harm to biodiversity*

Free-roaming capital and corporate-focused trade and investment agreements entrench drivers of biodiversity loss:⁷ Since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, flows of private and public capital have accelerated global environmental problems like climate change and biodiversity loss, exacerbating inequalities and concentrating power among global elites. Unregulated financial flows and the operations of footloose extractive firms have opened new, fragile spaces to commodity production, widening the gap between those who live with the environmental consequences of extraction and those who benefit from financing these developments. In 2019, 50 of the world’s largest banks underwrote more than USD 2.6 trillion into industries known to be the drivers of biodiversity loss, an amount equivalent to Canada’s gross domestic product (GDP).⁸ As a recent study concludes, “[t]he financial sector is bankrolling the mass extinction crisis, while undermining human rights and indigenous sovereignty”.⁹ The rules (or lack thereof) that govern international trade and investment are implicated in biodiversity loss and are a key impediment to achieving CBD decisions and objectives. Furthermore, multilateral development bank lending and assistance often comes with stipulations for trade and financial sector liberalization, policy shifts that are implicated in driving extractivist growth that imperils biodiversity.

Voluntary schemes have a limited ability to reduce or redirect resources harming biodiversity:¹⁰ In Rio 1992, global elites and developed countries pushed aside a regulatory approach to governing increasingly globalized economic development and investment.¹¹ With

⁴ Ghosh, J. (2020). How to build the global green new deal. Progressive International, May 7. <https://progressive.international/blueprint/80b03a68-68ca-4322-a3ad-c91775f167b9-jayati-ghosh-how-to-build-the-global-green-new-deal/en>

⁵ See “Update of the zero draft of the post-2020 global biodiversity framework”, <https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/3064/749a/0f65ac7f9def86707f4eaeafa/post2020-prep-02-01-en.pdf>, p. 6.

⁶ These goals are outlined in CBD/SBI/3/5, Annex II “Draft elements of a possible successor to the current strategy for resource mobilization”, <https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/2c34/9558/f1487764d65e89bafb74d8fa/sbi-03-05-en.pdf>, pp. 15-16. These three goals differ slightly from the five outlined in the GBF document in footnote 5.

⁷ See “Beyond the gap”, sections 2.2 and 2.3.

⁸ Portfolio Earth (2020). Bankrolling Extinction, p. 6. Retrieved from <https://portfolio.earth/>

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ For more information and research, see “Beyond the gap”, section 3.4.

¹¹ Rowe, J. K. (2005). Corporate Social Responsibility as a Business Strategy. In R. D. Lipschutz with J. K. Rowe,

states unwilling or unable to regulate transnational industries and trade, voluntary mechanisms that promised to influence corporate and financial behaviour took centre stage. Such mechanisms include the Global Compact, Equator Principles, the UN Principles for Responsible Investing, and many others. These voluntary approaches have shown little success in slowing global biodiversity loss and have not addressed the underlying drivers of biodiversity loss. The track record of voluntary regulation for corporate and financial actors offers a key lesson: banks, corporations, pension funds, and other financial actors have not proven willing to self-regulate their activities or investments, despite growing membership in a proliferation of global initiatives or efforts to assess climate or biodiversity risks.

Progress on phase-out of harmful subsidies is dismal:¹² Parties to the CBD recognize the need to “eliminate, phase out or reform” incentives that are harmful to biodiversity as a primary strategy for halting biodiversity loss, as captured in Aichi Target 3. Yet institutional commitments to action on this matter remain unfulfilled, and reforming harmful incentives is one of the worst-performing of the 20 Aichi Targets. Even conservative estimates of biodiversity-harming subsidies show that public spending on harmful incentives and subsidies continues to eclipse domestic and international spending on biodiversity initiatives: a 2020 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report estimated that the flow of subsidies potentially harmful to biodiversity was near USD 500 billion per year, an amount five to six times greater than the resources flowing towards conservation.¹³ Key roadblocks to progress on harmful subsidies include a lack of transparency and research on subsidy flows and their social and ecological impacts, and entrenched political power and elite interests benefitting from subsidies. Additionally, while the benefit of subsidies tends to be captured unequally across class, race, and gender, eliminating these programmes without alternatives may still disproportionately impact marginalized communities. As recently evidenced in Ecuador and Egypt, the elimination of fossil fuel subsidies

can be included in MDB-mandated economic reforms that amount to deepening austerity, disproportionately impacting communities more reliant on state services.¹⁴ For this reason, addressing local and global inequalities in political power and access to resources must be integral to phasing out harmful subsidies. Subsidies maintain inequitable patterns of resource use and decision-making, and dismantling them requires countervailing policies to redistribute resources in more equitable and sustainable ways.

b) Generating additional resources from all sources to achieve the three objectives of the Convention

Developed countries have failed to live up to obligations contained in Article 20 of the CBD and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR):¹⁵ On a macro scale, financing for biodiversity conservation and development in developing countries “falls well short of amounts promised in Rio by wealthy nations.”¹⁶ While aid funds have increased since the founding of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) in 1991, the amounts registered are far from the primary agreements made under Agenda 21, where countries committed about USD 18 billion annually for global environmental issues, of which USD 2 billion was directly designated for biodiversity protection. Furthermore, no donor nation has met its commitment “in any year since making this promise in 1992 ... [and t]otal funding is 58% of the Rio promise.”¹⁷ Insufficient funding and unequal political influence within the GEF have hampered achievement of Article 20 on Financial Resources and, subsequently, hampered achievement of the CBD objectives. In particular, it is crucial to recognize that financial support for Indigenous peoples and local communities (IPLCs) “is not commensurate with their contributions to sustainable use and conservation of biodiversity”.¹⁸ In light of these failed

¹⁴ Reyes, O. (2020). *Change Finance, Not the Climate*. Institute for Policy Studies and Transnational Institute.

¹⁵ See “Beyond the gap”, sections 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3.

¹⁶ Miller, D. C., Agrawal, A. and Roberts, J. T. (2013). Biodiversity, Governance, and the Allocation of International Aid for Conservation: Biodiversity Aid Allocation. *Conservation Letters*, 6(1), 12-20. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-263X.2012.00270.x>, p. 17.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

¹⁸ Forest Peoples Programme (2020). *Local Biodiversity Outlooks 2: The contributions of indigenous peoples and local communities to the implementation of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 and to renewing nature and cultures*, p. 29.

Globalization, Governmentality, and Global Politics: Regulation for the Rest of Us? (Routledge).

¹² See “Beyond the gap”, section 2.3.

¹³ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2020). *A Comprehensive Overview of Global Biodiversity Finance* (Final Report), p. 3. Retrieved from: <http://www.oecd.org/environment/resources/biodiversity/report-a-comprehensive-overview-of-global-biodiversity-finance.pdf>

commitments, the political move has been to emphasize the role of “all sources” of funding, including domestic resources, South-South cooperation, and private finance. The emphasis on domestic resources and South-South cooperation has shifted the burden onto developing countries, themselves often hampered by debt and subsequent austerity. Likewise, emphasis on private and “blended” finance helps developed countries to further evade the direct provision of funds required by Article 20 and, in particular, there is evidence that blended finance gives preferential treatment to donors’ private sector firms, including the financial sector.¹⁹

Pervasive austerity, high debt servicing, and weak tax regimes/tax avoidance hamper CBD implementation:²⁰ The logic and policy hegemony of austerity, often imposed through MDB lending conditionality for debt-burdened states, creates a pro-cyclical pattern of increased sovereign borrowing, resulting in foreign currency interest payments that drain foreign exchange reserves. This same debt-austerity nexus leads indebted nations to keep their domestic interest rates high in order to access loans, further draining public revenues. All of this means that there are minimal domestic resources that could otherwise help finance CBD objectives; studies show that increased state investment in environmental regulation and enforcement results in less biodiversity loss, even when correcting for pressures like economic growth and agricultural expansion.²¹ The first United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) report on the Environmental Rule of Law also found that many environmental laws are unimplemented or unenforced around the world, with implementing ministries often under-resourced and under-funded.²² High levels of debt servicing and structural adjustment policies also impede CBD national implementation through pressures to expand export-led commodity development that

threatens biodiversity and livelihoods. Austerity is exacerbated by wealthy elites and corporations avoiding and evading taxes, which further erodes public coffers and makes CBD implementation challenging and, in some cases, impossible.

For-profit financial flows for biodiversity-enhancing projects are small, geographically constrained, and in a perpetual state of “pilot projects”:²³ In the last two decades, the emphasis has been on mobilizing private financial resources to fill “the gap,” through either market-based conservation and marketization of ecosystem services or “blended finance” approaches that use public, philanthropic or supranational funding to “leverage”, “unlock” or “catalyze” private investments. These approaches themselves are symptoms of, rather than solutions to, ongoing austerity that constrains public funds, and there is evidence of negative social impacts, including violations of Indigenous and local community rights. Despite continual optimism about the volume of private capital available to fill the CBD financing gap, evidence from the last thirty years of efforts – from bioprospecting to forest carbon – casts doubt on the potential for these approaches to provide necessary resources for biodiversity conservation, and to do so in a manner consistent with human rights and social justice.

Market-based approaches like Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) do not represent a major new source of conservation finance, and have mixed biodiversity and livelihood impacts:²⁴ Providing a major lesson for governments and institutions advocating “nature-based solutions”, the research shows that in some cases PES have no positive outcomes and even negative impacts on biodiversity. Where programmes have been most successful at addressing land use change linked with biodiversity loss, they have been well-integrated with local practices, economies and institutions, with strong representation of local values and knowledge and equitable benefit-sharing. The track record of PES offers lessons for the design of context-sensitive environmental policy, but also suggests that such programmes are difficult to standardize and scale – another lesson to temper current NBS enthusiasm. As one study specifically focused on the potential of PES for resource provisioning under the CBD concludes,

¹⁹ Pereira, J. (2017). Blended finance: what it is, how it works and how it is used. Eurodad and Oxfam report. Retrieved from: https://www.eurodad.org/blended_finance_what_it_is_how_it_works_and_how_it_is_used

²⁰ See “Beyond the gap”, section 2.1.

²¹ See Waldron, A., Miller, D. C., Redding, D., Mooers, A., Kuhn, T. S., Nibbelink, N., ... Gittleman, J. L. (2017). Reductions in global biodiversity loss predicted from conservation spending. *Nature*, 551(7680), 364-367.

²² United Nations Environment Programme (2019). Environmental Rule of Law: First Global Report. United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi. Retrieved from: <https://www.unep.org/resources/assessment/environmental-rule-law-first-global-report>

²³ For more information and research, see “Beyond the gap”, sections 3.1 and 3.2.

²⁴ See “Beyond the gap”, section 3.1.

“Contrary to existing PES schemes, [a new] funding mechanism [for the CBD] should finance the long-term conservation of biodiversity in low-income and middle-income developing countries ... regardless of any other ecosystem services provided by an ecosystem.”²⁵ So while PES can be a useful tool, it has been insufficient to address biodiversity funding needs, and rarely addresses large-scale drivers of biodiversity loss. And as the *Local Biodiversity Outlooks 2* report states, it is crucial that all biodiversity financing efforts “strengthen safeguarding measures to address the continued negative impacts of biodiversity financing on IPLCs and to proactively secure their rights.”²⁶

c) Enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of resource use

The return on investment in market- and private-sector-oriented initiatives, including the use of blended finance or public-private partnerships (PPPs), has been low or negative at a broad scale:²⁷ Those promoting blended finance suggest that public investment will catalyze increased flows of private capital, making the most out of limited public funds. Yet the evidence raises serious questions about these claims, as seen in the perpetually moribund REDD+ market that remains completely dependent on public subsidy to achieve its very limited ecological and economic impacts.²⁸ Meanwhile researchers have highlighted how blended finance and the use of PPPs may reduce transparency and democratic control over public policy, fail to benefit the lowest-income countries, and also increase state debt loads.²⁹ Even the World Bank’s Commission on Growth and Development notes that PPPs tend to “put profit in

private hands, and risks in the public lap”.³⁰ Such warnings merit careful consideration. While the impetus to “catalyze”, “leverage”, or “crowd in” private investment through PPPs or blended finance for CBD implementation has become an increasingly common chorus, it is often sung most loudly by the institutions that enforce the rules of the global economy driving biodiversity loss. The need to attract private capital is symptomatic of broader political economic trends like austerity, the failure to meet Article 20 obligations, and inadequate financial and corporate regulation.

Emphasis on economic efficiency in biodiversity finance can expose both biodiversity and people to new market risks:³¹

With market-based mechanisms, focus on efficiency tends to go hand in hand with more disciplinary, market-like approaches, which can lead to negative social impacts. While market-driven PES programmes have been described by some as more effective and efficient than publicly-funded PES due to more targeting and conditionality (payments conditional on land use changes or ecosystem service delivery), such an emphasis can expose both biodiversity outcomes and participants’ livelihoods to new market risks. Risk taking may be acceptable for entrepreneurs building a new online game or software application, but is inappropriate when safeguarding planetary nature and livelihoods. These findings from the PES research should be central to any discussions of NBS.

The continual belief in the greater efficiency of market solutions is rooted in economic dogma, and is not upheld by evidence from several decades of attempts to put these solutions into practice:³²

While market-oriented programmes, including PES or what now go by NBS, may play a role in supporting equity and biodiversity outcomes in specific contexts, attempts to make these function like ‘efficient’ markets tend to narrow the scope of benefits prioritized, and require a great deal of state resources. Based on the evidence, a much more efficient and effective route for global action would be financial regulation focused on the root causes of biodiversity loss and the redirection and managed phase-out of harmful subsidies – in other words,

²⁵ Hein, L., Miller, D. C. and de Groot, R. (2013). Payments for ecosystem services and the financing of global biodiversity conservation. *Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability*, 5(1), 87-93, p. 91.

²⁶ Forest Peoples Programme (2020), op. cit., p. 29.

²⁷ See “Beyond the gap”, section 3.3.

²⁸ Olesen, A., Böttcher, H., Siemons, A., Herrmann, L., Martius, C., Román-Cuesta, R. M., ... Wunder, S. (2018). *Study on EU financing of REDD+ related activities, and results-based payments pre and post 2020: Sources, cost-effectiveness and fair allocation of incentives*. Retrieved from European Union Publications Office website: <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/6f8dea1e-b6fe-11e8-99ee-01aa75ed71a1>

²⁹ Romero, M. J. and Ravenscroft, J. (eds.) (2018). *History RePPPeated: How public-private partnerships are failing*. Coordinated by Eurodad and produced by civil society organizations around the world in cooperation with the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung.

³⁰ World Bank Commission on Growth and Development (2008). *The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development*, p. 36.

³¹ See “Beyond the gap”, sections 3.1 and 3.2.

³² See “Beyond the gap”, sections 2.3, 3.1, and 3.4.

committed action on the first pillar of the resource mobilization mission.

Recommendations

1) **End the debt-austerity nexus that fuels extractivism and impedes CBD implementation.** To advance the call for transformative change, Parties to the CBD must:

- Reject austerity/debt-led international and national policies that continue to cripple advancement of CBD and Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) objectives as well as pandemic recovery, and instead push for robust North-South transfers necessary to support global health, climate and biodiversity.³³
- Reaffirm and deliver on Article 20 obligations not as aid or charity but as payment for developed countries' vast ecological debts.
- Increase Global Environment Facility and other funding to Indigenous and community initiatives.³⁴
- Push for sovereign debt restructuring in line with CBD objectives and decisions, including some level of debt cancellation or restructuring that can allow governments to prioritize investments in quality public services as well as pandemic recovery that is just and sustainable.³⁵ As part of this effort, CBD Parties should request the Subsidiary Body on Implementation (SBI) to undertake a study on the relationship between debt, austerity and CBD implementation, with a view to removing specific impediments to CBD implementation.

2) **Regulate finance and penalize industries known to damage biodiversity and the rights of Indigenous peoples and local communities.** The language in the current GBF is weak, and there is a risk that the emphasis will be on voluntary disclosure and actions well-known to be ineffective. Parties should:

- Eliminate subsidies harming biodiversity and communities, and redirect these financial resources, along with wasteful military spending, to support Indigenous, peasant and smallholder stewardship.
- Actively support efforts to develop an international, legally-binding instrument on business and human rights that incorporates clear liability standards for corporate violations and abuse of human rights and guarantees victims' access to remedy and justice, including restoration and compensation for damage to biological diversity.³⁶
- Revise fiduciary duty and associated concepts that govern institutional finance to require protection of public goods like a safe climate and biological diversity, and to include commitments to international legal norms and standards like the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas (UNDROP).
- Require public pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and central bank policies to align with CBD objectives and decisions through regulation (not voluntary measures).
- Ensure trade and investment agreements do not have provisions that negate or undermine CBD objectives and wider human, Indigenous, and peasant rights.
- Implement the "polluter pays principle", including taxes or levies on damaging activities like international shipping, extractive industries and industrial agriculture, for example.
- Establish a legal obligation of due diligence including the obligation to consider, identify and disclose biodiversity risks at every level of the investment chain, including upon institutional investors and asset managers. This due diligence obligation should be associated with commensurate sanctions in case of non-fulfilment.
- Establish rules pertaining to corporate disclosures, including Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) risks, in a

³³ See Kozul-Wright, R. (2020). Recovering Better from COVID-19 Will Need a Rethink of Multilateralism. *Development*. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41301-020-00264-y>

³⁴ See also Forest Peoples Programme (2020), op. cit.

³⁵ Ibid. Please note that this recommendation does not endorse debt-for-nature swaps, which we review in the longer dossier (section 2.1) this briefing builds from.

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See: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/wgtranscorp/pages/igwgnontnc.aspx>

way that improves the quality, standardization and comparability of the non-financial disclosures about key sustainability risks, including biological diversity.³⁷

3) **Ensure biodiversity finance does not impede transformative change nor undermine CBD objectives, UNDRIP, and UNDROP.** The record of voluntary and market-based mechanisms, including offsets, is disappointing across social, economic, and environmental criteria, yet they continue to hold prominence in CBD discussions. Parties should:

- Reject financial and market-based mechanisms that impede or undermine necessary transformative change, like biodiversity and ecosystem-based carbon offsets that legitimize business-as-usual extractivism and power relations.
- Ensure that market-like incentive schemes such as PES, if used, support efforts to address indirect and large-scale drivers of biodiversity loss, including inequitable development and resource use, and respect the rights of Indigenous peoples and local communities.
- Ensure that biodiversity financing advances all three objectives of the CBD and does not undermine decisions taken to advance and secure the rights of Indigenous peoples, peasants, women, and local communities.
- Strengthen safeguards for all flows of biodiversity finance – including private and public – to ensure the free, prior and informed consent of all rights-holders and other stakeholders.³⁸
- Reject blended finance and public-private partnerships that continue to socialize losses and privatize gains, and instead implement strong regulatory approaches as outlined above (under point 2) that will more effectively shift capital flows away from degrading activities.

4) **Reduce domestic and international wealth and power inequalities that impede transformational change.**

Wealth inequalities concentrate power, and this power makes the necessary transformational policy change difficult. Parties should:

- Enact effective safeguards for environmental and land defenders.³⁹
 - Support the development of a UN Tax Convention to address tax havens and tax abuse by multinational corporations and other illicit financial flows through a universal and intergovernmental process.⁴⁰
 - Implement progressive tax measures, including but not limited to international and national wealth taxes, and raising tax rates of global banks and large firms, to increase funding available for CBD implementation, to support a just recovery from the pandemic, and to redress the social and environmental impacts of inequality.
 - Support antitrust measures that break up the power of big finance and corporations which hold disproportionate influence on policymaking.
- 5) **Act on dismantling class, caste, racial and gender inequalities that underpin biodiversity loss and impede conservation and sustainable use.** Parties should:
- Recognize the role that racial, gender, caste and wealth inequalities play as drivers of biodiversity loss and as impediments to the three objectives of the CBD.⁴¹
 - Establish an expert group, to report to SBI 4, to further study the relationship between racial, gender, caste and wealth inequalities and CBD objectives/decisions.
 - Focus resource mobilization – including the GEF resources – on supporting ongoing stewardship and legal/political orders of Indigenous peoples and smallholder fishers/farmers who are enacting conservation and sustainable use,

³⁹ Ibid., p. 13.

⁴⁰ See UN Intergovernmental Tax Commission, for example, <https://www.un.org/development/desa/financing/what-we-do/ECOSOC/tax-committee/tax-committee-home>

⁴¹ See, for example, Tendayi Achiume, E. (2019). Natural resource extractivism and racial equality. Thematic report of Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Racism/SRRacism/Pages/ThematicReportNaturalResourceExtraction.aspx>

³⁷ See “Corporate Governance for Sustainability” Statement, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3502101

³⁸ See also recommendation in Forest Peoples Programme (2020), op. cit., p. 29.

but who for so long have been criminalized and blamed for the loss of biodiversity.

Our team is composed of social scientists from the University of British Columbia in Canada (Jessica Dempsey, Adriana DiSilvestro, Audrey Irvine-Broque, Fernanda Rojas-Marchini, Sara Nelson, Andrew Schuldt), Lancaster University in the UK (Patrick Bigger, Jens Christiansen), and Duke University in the US (Elizabeth Shapiro-Garza). The emphasis in this briefing, which builds on a research dossier “Beyond the gap: placing biodiversity finance in the global economy”, stems from our particular areas of expertise: political ecology, political economy of nature, multi-scalar environmental governance and environmental change, and the uneven distribution of environmental damage and biodiversity loss.

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